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ABSTRACT 
 
Unilingual Versus Bilingual Education System:  
A Political Economy Analysis∗ 
 
We consider an economy with two language groups, where only agents who share a 
language can produce together. Schooling enhances the productivity of students and may 
modify their language endowment. Under a unilingual system, the language of the politically 
dominant group is the only language of instruction, and the members of the politically 
dominated group who attend school shift language. Instead, under a bilingual system, the 
members of the dominated group who attend school become bilingual. The dominant group 
chooses the education system, and then individuals decide whether to attend school. While 
agents do not get utility from speaking their own language, we show that a language conflict 
of the expected type endogenously arises in the choice between a unilingual and a bilingual 
system. Democracy (majority rule) always leads to the implementation of the socially optimal 
education system, while the unilingual system is too often implemented under minority rule. 
In the presence of productivity spillovers, there may be unanimity for unilingualism, even if 
this system is assumed to be technologically inferior. The model is consistent with evidence 
from Finland in 1919 and France in 1863, showing that the choice of bilingualism in education 
may not be related to the size of language groups. 
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1 Introduction
In 2000, half of the countries in the world had at least one language minority corresponding to more
than 10% of their population.1 This language diversity has recently brought language policies to
the forefront of political debate in such countries as Malaysia, Spain, Latvia, the ex-Soviet Muslim
States, Belgium or the U.S. As stressed by sociolinguists, one crucial component behind language
shift in populations over generations is the choice of the language(s) of instruction in school.
For example, Fishman (1977) argues that for language spread, schools have long been the major
formal (organized) mechanisms involved...(p.116).2 In other terms, languages which are not given
the status of medium of instruction in school tend to be replaced by the languages that are.
The cases of France and Finland provide two illustrations of the importance of language policies
for language development. In the late 18th century, around 60% of those living in France did
actually not speak French (Grégoire, 1794), but rather other languages.3 Nowadays, everybody
speaks French, and the other languages are spoken by only 5% of the population.4 Instrumental in
this development was the implementation of a unilingual education system from the 1880s which
established French as the sole language of instruction in school. At the other end of the spectrum,
the bilingual Finnish-Swedish education system implemented upon Finlands independence from
Russia in 1917, has been one of the factors explaining the relative good shape of Swedish in
contemporary Finland. The native Swedish-speaking population has remained almost constant in
absolute numbers (314,000 native Swedish-speakers in 1920 and 293,000 in 2000) and declined to
some extent in relative terms (from 11 percent of the total population in 1920 to 5.9 percent in
2000).5
Given the importance of language of instruction choice, we set-up a model for understanding
why some multilingual countries choose unilingual education while others maintain language di-
versity, and for identifying the conditions under which conßict among language groups may arise.
In addition, we provide a normative characterisation of the ability of different political systems to
implement the socially optimal education system.
We begin by illustrating a historical puzzle that will be elaborated and empirically supported
in the Þrst section. One would intuitively guess that the likelihood of observing a unilingual
system is directly related to the size of the language majority. As a Þrst step, a comparison of
the Finnish and the French cases does not go in that direction. Indeed, while a unilingual system
was chosen in 40% French-speaking France, a bilingual system was almost unanimously chosen in
1Data are from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2003). Worldwide, 48.5% of the countries are multilingual ac-
cording to a 10% minority deÞnition. Proportions vary accross continents: 19.4% of the countries for the Americas,
43.2% for Europe, 44.9% for Asia, 50% for Oceania, and 77.6% for Africa.
2See also for example Hagège (1996) for the case of France.
3The largest regional language was Occitan, and then came Breton and Alsacian. Other smaller language groups
were speaking Basque, Catalan, Flemish, Franco-provençal, Corsican, and Franconian.
4Encyclopaedia Britannica (2003)
5Data for 1920 are from McRae (1997) and for 2000 from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2003).
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90% Finnish-speaking Finland. One may argue that this contrast is due to national speciÞties.
However, using regional data for 1860s France, we show that the proportion of French-speaking
schools is unrelated to the proportion of local French-speakers. Our model explains why majority
size may not be the most relevant variable for understanding the choice of education system.
Our economy consists of individuals belonging to one of two language groups, the politically
dominant and dominated, initially unable to communicate. The dominant group decides Þrst
on the characteristics of the educational system and then individuals choose whether to attend
school or not. Schooling enhances the productivity of the students and can be either unilingual
or bilingual. Under a unilingual schooling system, the language of the politically dominant group
is the unique language of instruction. As a result, the students belonging to the dominated group
shift language when leaving school.6 In contrast, under a bilingual system, the students from the
dominated group become bilingual. Value comes from bilateral production after schooling among
agents who speak the same language. Finally, in order to keep the model simple, the individual
cost of taking education is assumed to be the same under both language systems.7 This implies
that we give an advantage to the bilingual over the unilingual system, as a student from the
dominated group gets a richer language endowment under bilingualism than under unilingualism
without bearing an additional cost.
The model has thus two central assumptions. First, individuals take an economic decision on
whether to attend school or not. This assumption is in line with the growing literature showing that
economic incentives have an impact on school attendance in developing countries (see for example
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003). Second, schooling is a bundle, as it simultaneously
enhances the productivity (or earnings) of the student and can modify its language endowment.
This is because we are interested here in the choice of the language of instruction, and not in
language training in general.8 The positive effect of education on earnings is a well established
fact in the literature (see Card, 1999) while the choice of the language of instruction in schooling
is an important factor behind language shift according to sociolinguists (e.g. Fishman, 1977 or
Hagège, 1996).
Individual education decisions are characterised by communication externalities whose nature
varies across educational systems. Under the unilingual system, a member of the dominated
group who chooses to take education loses her initial language, and therefore reduces the set of
production partners of the other members of the dominated group, unless they choose themselves
to attend school and learn the dominant language. For this reason, a positive communication
externality links the education decisions across dominated group members, and high educational
6Language shift due to schooling needs in general more than one generation to be accomplished, but here we
assume it takes places instantaneously in order to keep the model static.
7Individuals attach no utility to speaking their mothertongue. Adding such a utility term would complicate the
analysis, but not qualitatively affect any of the results. We return to this issue at various points in the paper.
8From a theoretical viewpoint, we are thus assuming away the possibility that agents go to schools that exclu-
sively provide language training.
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levels reinforce the individual incentives for taking education (a bandwagon effect). Under the
bilingual system, in contrast, this effect vanishes, as dominated group members who attend school
do not lose their initial language.
We show that the dominant group prefers the education system that maximises the equilibrium
education level of the other group, as higher education of the other group translates into a larger
number of production partners, since more individuals learn the language of the dominant group.
In turn, the dominated group never prefers the unilingual system, as the bandwagon effect arising
under unilingual education locks them in equilibria with undereducation (overeducation) when
schooling is cheap (expensive).
All political tension arising in equilibrium is of the expected type, i.e., situations in which the
dominant group goes for unilingualism while the dominated group prefers a system in which their
native language is also a language of instruction. This is an interesting result since it does not
rely on any direct utility enjoyed by the agents from speaking their own native language. The
dominated group wants its language to be used in schools not because their members like it
but rather because abandoning it would force them to overinsvest in education, due to the band-
wagon effect. The dominant group goes for unilingualism in order to free-ride on the educational
investment of the other group.
There may be unanimity for the bilingual system as well. This happens for example when
education is very cheap. In this case everybody prefers all to take education.
We determine the socially optimal education system. When a benevolent planner can choose
the education level of each individual, bilingualism is always the optimal system, as for given
education levels more people communicate and hence produce under the bilingual than under the
unilingual system. If the central planner can choose the education system but school attendance
remains in the hands of the individuals, bilingualism is not necessarily optimal anymore, as the
bandwagon effect may induce larger education levels under the unilingual system.
Next, we address the issue of failure in political decision-making, i.e., we analyse the circum-
stances, if any, under which the political decision process leads to the adoption of the wrong
type of education system. We show that a democratic rule (the majority decides the education
system) always leads to the adoption of the socially optimal decentralised system in our model.
In contrast, under minority rule, the unilingual system is implemented too often.
Finally, we extend the model to consider productivity spillovers among production partners,
i.e. situations in which the productivity of each agent positively depends on the skill level of
the other production partner. Under spillovers, unanimity for a unilingual education system
becomes an equilibrium outcome when education is not expensive: in that case, the members
of the dominated group are willing to give up their own language in order to beneÞt from a
high education equilibrium. This is an interesting result, as we have attributed an advantage to
bilingualism over unilingualism. Why does the existence of spillovers make the dominated willing
to support a unilingual system? The reason is that spillovers strengthen the bandwagon effect in
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the unilingual system, and do not alter incentives in the bilingual system. More precisely, in the
unilingual system, the net gain from schooling for a dominated group member becomes increasing
in the number of educated peers through an additional channel: by attending school in a situation
in which many peers do so, a dominated group member not only gains many production partners,
but also enhances her productivity in the matches with these partners.
Our model is related to the growing literature on language adoption, and in particular to Lazear
(1999), Church and King (1993), and John and Yi (2001).9 Like in these three papers, agents in
our model choose whether they make a costly investment in learning a language that can be used in
trade or production with other agents. However, in constrast with these papers, we consider here
an investment decision that ties skill acquisition and language acquisition, as languages which
are used as media of instruction are learnt while learning other subjects at schools (e.g. while
learning mathematics, history...). While in Lazear (1999) agents behave competitively, in our
model, just as in Church and King (1993) and John and Yi (2001), the investment decision is
strategic and the equilibrium outcome depends on a network externality, i.e. a situation in which
the decision of an agent to learn a language increases the number of partners (and thus the utility)
of the individuals speaking that language.10 Our paper differs from the two latter contributions
because the type of network externalities under consideration is endogeneised here, as it depends
on the choice between a unilingual and a bilingual education system. Another difference is that our
explanation of language shift is based on the choice of schooling institutions, while John and Yi
(2001) provides an explanation based on geography (more precisely, on the existence of migrations
at equilibrium) and on a language transmission rule across generations.11 Finally, the derivation
of language conßict or consensus as an equilibrium outcome are also novel.
2 Motivation and historical evidence
This section studies available evidence on the link between the size of language minorities and
the choice of a unilingual education system. One would intuitively guess that a larger minority
reduces the likelihood to observe a unilingual system. Instead, here we provide evidence that this
9There are other papers studying language. Breton and Mieszkowski (1977) studies in a trade model second
language acquisition as a human capital investment. Lang (1986) proposes a language theory of discrimination.
Pool (1991) and Laitin (1994) analyse the choice of an official language in multilingual countries. Mélitz (2002) shows
that having a common language promotes international trade. Saint-Paul (2001) studies mechanisms through which
linguistic stratiÞcation can arise as an equilibrium outcome. In addition, there is a large literature on language
proÞciency and earnings (see e.g. Chiswick and Miller, 1995) and a new literature on the possible linguistic
organisation of the European Union (see Ginsburgh and Weber, 2004 and van Parijs, 2004).
10The economics of networks has been extensively studied in the industrial organisation literature, see Farrell and
Klemperer (2004) for a recent survey. Research along this line has generally focused on the problem of adaption
and coordination from the perspective of proÞt maximising Þrms. We take a here a political economy perspective
on network adaption.
11More precisely, John and Yi (2001) assumes that bilingual parents have unilingual children in a certain language
if the language distribution in the location is skewed towards that language.
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Table 1: Voting on language in Finland (1919-1922)
Political Party Seats Electoral basis Choices
Social Democrats 80 FI-SWE BI
Agrarians 42 FI UNI-BI
National Coalition (conservatives) 28 FI BI
National Progressive Party (liberals) 26 FI mostly BI
Swedish People Party 22 SWE BI
Sources: Jackson (1938) and McRae (1997)
may not be the case. We Þrst compare the set-up of the current Finnish and French education
systems (see Ortega and Tangerås, 2003, for more details). Next, we provide evidence across
French départements (small administrative regions).
2.1 Finland versus France
The current institutional language framework in Finland was set up with the Constitution of
1919 and a series of language laws, the most important being approved in 1922. In 1920, the
Swedish-speakers constituted only 11% of the Finnish population (McRae, 1997) and the rest of
the population was Finnish-speaking.12 Nevertheless, a bilingual education system was approved
with very large majorities.13 Table 1 presents the composition of the Finnish Parliament in 1919
and shows that the support came from both language groups. The Constitution recognises Finnish
and Swedish as national languages on an equal basis. Concerning the educational system, each
municipality has to organise schooling in the minority language (Swedish or Finnish) when a
minimum number of parents requires it.
The foundations of the French language policy were decided during the French Revolution
(1789-1794). In 1794, the prelate Grégoire presented before the Convention (Parliament) his
report on the language situation in France (Grégoire, 1794). Grégoire argued that there were only
15 departements (out of 83) in which French was the only language spoken. Additionnally, it
can be stated without exageration that six million French, especially in the countryside, do not
know the national language; that an equal number is more or less unable to maintain a sustained
conversation; and that Þnally the number of those who speak it does not exceed three million
(Grégoire, 1794). Given that the total French population at that time was around 26 million, this
would mean that roughly only 2/5 of the population was native French-speaker (Calvet, 2002).
Among the other language groups, the biggest was Occitan (southern-half of the country), and next
12Except for a tiny Sami group.
13The language clauses of the Constitution were approved with a very wide consensus (173 yes to 23 no, 165
yes to 22 no, 183 yes to 10 noand 183 yes to 7 no, see Eduskunta-Riksdag, 1920, pp. 1028-30).
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came Breton and Alsacian. Additionally, small minorities were speaking Franco-provençal, Basque,
Catalan, Corsican or Flemish. Each departement (with the exception of the Basses-Pyrénées) had
at most two language groups.
As stressed by Hagège (1996), language policy quickly became an important issue in the polit-
ical choices of the Revolution. After an initial period in which the translation of the decrees into
other languages was decided,14 the newly born Republic controlled by the montagnards (radical
revolutionaries) chose French-unilingualism in a period of external war and provincial insurrection.
In June 1794, Grégoire presented a report which argues that: Everything we said leads us to the
conclusion that, in order to extirpate the prejudices, develop all the truths, the talents, the vertues,
merge all the citizens in the national mass, simplify the political mechanisms, we need identity of
language (Grégoire, 1794, p. 341). A series of French-unilingual language decrees were approved,
but did not survive the fall of the montagnards in July 1794. As argued by Weber (1976), The
[language] policy foundered. (...) What survived from the shipwreck was the principle (p. 72).
Comparing Finland and France opens a puzzle: bilingualism arose almost unanimously in
a country where the majority represented 90% of the population while unilingualism was the
outcome in a country where the biggest language group represented 40% of the population. One
may argue that this puzzle can be explained by refering to the particular characteristics of these
two countries. For example, French-speakers and Swedish-speakers were over-represented in the
élites in France and Finland respectively, so the political power of the language minority in Finland
may have been larger than that of the non-French speakers in France. Alternatively, one could
argue that the main difference was the existence of more than two language groups in France, and
just two in Finland. However, we show now that the same type of puzzle remains when we look
at what happened inside France.
2.2 Looking inside France
In 1863, the Minister of Public Instruction under Napoleon III, Victor Duruy, organised an inquiry
into the languages spoken by the population of the by then 89 departments, together with the
language(s) of instruction in public schools. The data (see Weber, 1976) show that there was
important cross-regional variation in educational systems at that time, before the introduction of
the Ferry Laws in 1880-82, which instituted free primary education and legally established French
as the only language of instruction in schools (Chervel, 1992).
The data contain information on the linguistic composition of the population in each depart-
ment (French-speakers versus non-French speakers15), together with the number of public
schools using French only, using idiom or patois16 only or using both.
14see Alcouffe and Brummert (1985).
15Note that the data are quite aggregated, since we get information on the number of inhabitants in French-
speaking communes and Non-French-speaking communes.
16The term patois refers to all the languages and dialects in France, except French.
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Figure 1 plots the proportion of public schools using French only versus the proportion of
French-speakers in the population for the 34 departments that were not fully French-speaking in
1863. In addition, each of the 55 fully French-speaking departments had a fully French-unilingual
system. The scatter plot does not show any pattern of correlation between the two variables.
We next regress the proportion of French-unilingual schools on a number of department-level
variables for the 89 departments. The results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 shows that there
is a positive relationship between the proportion of French-speakers in the population and the
proportion of French-unilingual schools. In addition, the proportion of French-unilingual schools is
positively related to the number of teachers in public schools per 10,000 inhabitants. This result
relates to the analysis by Grew and Harrigan (1991), which shows that government investment in
teachers for public schools started well before the Ferry Laws (1880s). Following the principles set
up during the Revolution, these new teachers were trained to teach in French. The Þrst regression
also considers the average direct cost of education for parents in each department. Interestingly, a
higher cost of education is positively related to the proportion of French-unilingual schools. This
may indicate that parents were willing to invest more in education if schools were in French (most
likely following a social mobility argument, as French was necessary in skilled occupations).
Fig. 1: Education systems in French departments, 1863.
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This Þrst regression however does not take into account that in the 55 fully French-speaking
departments the possibility of having non-French speaking schools was not even considered. For
this reason, we introduce a dummy variable for unilingual French-speaking departments in the
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Table 2: The proportion of French-unilingual public schools at the department level in France
(1863)
Dependent variable: Proportion of French-unilingual public schools
French-speakers in the population .108**
(.046)
-.015
(.080)
.094
(.072)
.006
(.066)
Teachers in public schools (/10,000 inhab.) .004**
(.002)
.004**
(.002)
.003
(.002)
.003
(.002)
Amount paid for education by a family .025***
(.008)
.024***
(.008)
.012**
(.007)
.013*
(.007)
Log income per head .044
(.054)
.003
(.053)
.035
(.044)
Unilingual French-speaking department (dummy) .102*
(.054)
.256***
(.057)
.251***
(.051)
Romance language other than French (dummy) .303***
(.044)
.251***
(.041)
Notes: The Þgures reported are the coefficients obtained from OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *,
** and *** denote signiÞcance at 10%, at 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Data on language are from the Archives
Nationales and can be found in Weber (1976). Data on average income levels are from Vapereau (1867). The
remaining data are from Ministère de lInstruction Publique (1878). All data refer to 1863.
regressions of Columns 2 to 4. Column 2 shows that the relationship between the proportion of
French-speakers in the population and the proportion of French-unilingual schools becomes non
signiÞcant when the dummy for unilingual French-speaking departments is introduced.
The regression in Columns 3 and 4 further includes an indicator for whether the second language
spoken in multilingual departments is a Romance language. These two regressions show that the
proportion of French-unilingual schools was higher in departments where French was coexisting
with another Romance language. This can be easily understood by inspection of Figure 1 if we
notice that departments like Ariège, Aude, Corrèze, Haute-Garonne, Ardèche, etc in which Occitan
(a Romance language) was spoken in addition to French had a tendency to adopt a fully French
unilingual system. Again, in both regressions, the coefficient on the proportion of French-speakers
remains statistically non-signiÞcant.
It appears thus from this analysis that no clear-cut relation can be established in the case
of France at the department level between the size of the language groups and the language(s)
of instruction chosen. The model that follows explains why minority size may not be the most
relevant variable for understanding the choice of education system.
3 The model
Consider a country inhabited by a continuum of individuals, normalised to unity. There are two
language groups in the country, m and n, of sizes M ∈ (0, 1) and N = 1 − M , respectively.
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Initially, the ms speak mish and the ns speak nish. ms and ns are unable to communicate unless
they learn to speak a common language.
Value is created through bilateral production between individuals.17 Each individual has the
opportunity of producing once with every other individual.18 Bilateral production occurs if and
only if the two partners are able to communicate, i.e. if they speak a common language. If they
cannot communicate, the value of production is equal to zero.
Individuals choose whether to attend school or not. An individual who takes education becomes
skilled and produces 1 + σ (σ > 0) when meeting any other agent with whom she is able to
communicate. An individual who does not take education produces instead 1 with any partner
speaking the same language.19
Schooling also involves language training, the type depending on the educational system. This
paper compares a unilingual to a bilingual education system.
Under the unilingual system, mish20 is the unique language of instruction. For this reason, the
m-group is also referred to througout the paper as the dominant group and the n-group as the
dominated group. Thems who attend school keep their initial language, while the ns learnmish
and lose their initial language. Indeed, as shown by linguists (see e.g. Fishman, 1977, for English,
and Hagège, 1996, for the case of France) one crucial factor behind language shift in populations
over generations is the choice of the language(s) of instruction in school. In other terms, languages
not given the status of medium of instruction in primary school tend to be replaced by the language
used in school. Here for simplicity we assume that this language shift takes place in the life span
of one generation.21
Under the bilingual system, all the members of the dominated group who take education go
to schools which have both nish and mish as languages of instruction. For this reason, they end
up speaking both languages after leaving school. The dominant group members go to schools
in which mish is the unique language of instruction, as in the unilingual system. The bilingual
system is thus here a system which protects the language of the dominated group, typically the
minority language in democracy.22
17As e.g. in Diamond (1982) or Lazear (1999).
18Equivalently, agents consider their expected payoffs when taking decisions. We are assuming away the possibility
that agents belonging to a certain language group are concentrated in a particular location. For an analysis including
this geographical dimension, see John and Yi (2001).
19In this model, the value of production for an individual is independent of the skill level of the production
partner. In section 7, we consider the case with productivity spillovers.
20The assignment of the dominant role to the m group is arbitrary and without loss of generality. So far we
have not speciÞed the relative sizes of the two groups. Nor have we described the political process by which the
educational system is chosen. We do not explain here the reasons for which one group becomes the politically
dominant group. This is as in Lang (1986), where one group is exogenously assigned the role of the economically
dominant group because its capital-labour ratio is assumed to be larger than that of the other group.
21For a dynamic set-up in which the language spoken by the children (exogenously) depends on the language
spoken by the parents and the language spoken in the geographical location, see John and Yi (2001).
22In the case of Finland, for example, there is only one language of instruction (Finnish or Swedish), and then
the other language is also taught. One may think that a symmetric bilingual system is a better representation of
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The personal cost c of taking education is assumed constant across the population and inde-
pendent of the educational system. This means that we give an advantage to the bilingual system
over the unilingual system, as an n going to school in the bilingual system gets (ceteris paribus)
access to more production partners than in the unilingual system after paying exactly the same
cost.23 Denoting by µm (µn) the fraction of ms (ns) that take education, we now deÞne the payoffs
associated to taking and not taking education in each of the systems.
3.1 Payoffs in unilingual education
The expected utility of taking education under a unilingual system, given expected education
shares is:24
Uuni(µn) = −c+ (1 + σ)(M +Nµn). (1)
An individual who attends school pays cost c, becomes skilled, and speaks mish when leaving
school. She gets 1 + σ from production with each of the M members of the dominant group and
each of the Nµn members of the dominated who have shifted language because they have attended
school. This means that each skilled individual beneÞts from more ns taking education, due to
an expansion of her set of production partners. This positive communication externality (network
externality) turns out to be key in educational choice.
An unskilled m has the same production partners as the skilled, as she speaks mish. This
agent saves on the cost of education, but gets only a value of 1 when producing:
Uunim (µn) =M +Nµn. (2)
Unskilled ms improve their situation when more ns take education due to the same positive
communication externality playing for the skilled. However, here the size of the externality is
smaller since each additional production partner from the n group increases the pay-off of an
unskilled agent by 1.
Finally, the expected utility of not attending school for a member of the dominated group is
Uunin (µn) = N(1− µn) (3)
the Finnish system. However, the knowledge of Swedish among the Finnish-speaking majority is relatively low.
In a previous version of this paper (Ortega and Tangerås, 2003) we considered the case of a symmetric bilingual
system, i.e. a system in which both language groups were taught in both languages. We discuss throughout the
paper the results under a symmetric bilingual system whenever they are different to the results we get here.
23We could have assumed instead different costs for each system. We have not chosen that option for two
reasons. The main reason is that the results are rich enough with identical costs across systems. In addition, in a
country which initially has two language groups, it is not clear that setting-up a unilingual system is cheaper than
implementing a bilingual system. For example, important investments may be needed in order to insure that there
is a sufficient number of teachers speaking the unique language of instruction.
24There is no need to make a distinction between ns and ms who take education since they speak the same
language and have identical skill levels subsequent to becoming educated.
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under the unilingual system. Indeed, an n who does not go to school speaks nish, and thus can
only produce with the N(1−µn) members of the dominated group who have not attended school.
Clearly, every unskilled n loses from any of her peers taking education through a contraction of
her set of production partners. Hence, education imposes a negative communication externality
on those of the ns who remain unskilled.
3.2 Payoffs in bilingual education
Concerning the bilingual system, note Þrst that the expected utilities of the dominant group
members are the same as under the unilingual system. This is because the ms never learn nish
and thus any positive production with members of the dominated group takes place in mish, as
in the unilingual system.25 For this reason,
U bim(µn) = U
uni(µn) (4)
U bim(µn) = U
uni
m (µn). (5)
In contrast, bilingual education alters the payoffs of the ns. Indeed, as the bilingual system
guarantees that the ns keep nish even if they go to school, neither the value of attending school
nor the value of not attending school for an n depend on the education choices of her peers. More
precisely, a skilled n pays c for education, produces with everybody, and gets 1 + σ in each case,
i.e.,
U bin = −c+ 1 + σ, (6)
while an n who chooses to remain unskilled can still produce with all the ns, as the ns who have
become skilled keep nish due to bilingual schooling:
U bin = N . (7)
3.3 Equilibrium
The timing of the game is as follows. First, anticipating the future levels of education, the edu-
cational system is chosen so as to maximise the expected utility of the dominant group. Second,
all the individuals independently and simultaneously choose whether to take education. We con-
sider without loss of generality symmetric Nash Equilibria in which all members of each group
randomise between education and staying unskilled with the same probability.
25In the bilingual system, the dominated group members who attend school are bilingual, but this does not affect
the payoff of any of the ms, since the ms never speak nish.
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4 Equilibrium education levels
4.1 The unilingual education system
We Þrst derive the equilibrium education levels under the unilingual system. By subtracting (3)
from (1), we obtain the net beneÞt of the representative n of taking education:
4Uunin (µn) = −c+ (M +Nµn)σ +M +Nµn −N(1− µn). (8)
When attending school, this individual pays cost c, becomes skilled, and shifts language from
nish to mish. In equation (8), the productivity gain from education is given by (M +Nµn)σ i.e.
the marginal value of education σ times production partners after schooling, namely the ms and
the other skilled ns. In addition, education alters the set of individuals with whom producing is
possible. This communication effect is captured by the remaining terms in (8). First, speaking
mish after school enables production with the M native mish speakers and with the Nµn new
mish speakers. At the same time, the skilled n forgets nish and thus can no longer produce with
the N(1− µn) unskilled ns.
Equation (8) generates an insight crucial to the understanding of the preferences over education
systems. For the ns, attending a unilingual school implies both becoming skilled and shifting
language. Clearly, both features of unilingual schooling are more attractive the smaller the number
of nish speakers and in particular the larger the number of other ns going to the unilingual school.
This positive communication externatility is thus at the origin of a bandwagon or snowball effect
in the decision of taking education of the ns. Indeed, upon inspection of (8), it is easy to check
that the net beneÞt from schooling for an n is increasing in the number of ns taking education
(µn). This bandwagon effect gives rise to multiple equilibria if sufficiently strong. In addition to
the possibility of two extreme equilibria in which either all or none of the ns take education, a
mixed equilibrium may exist.26
Let us turn now to the choice of a representative m. Her net beneÞt of attending school is
obtained by subtracting (2) from (1):
4Um(µn) = −c+ (M +Nµn)σ. (9)
Here, only the productivity gain shows up, since schooling does not alter the language endowment
of them and thus her set of production partners is unchanged by education. At the same time, note
that the representative ms incentive for taking education positively depends on the educational
level of the ns, as the skilled ns speakmish. Figure 2 characterises the set of equilibrium education
levels (consult appendix 9.1 for full analytical details).
Let us Þrst consider the area above the M(c− σ) line i.e. the north-west part of the Þgure.27
26This unstable equilibrium is sometimes referred to as a tipping equilibrium, a term coined by Schelling (1978).
27M(c − σ) is upward sloping for the following reason: as the cost of education increases, getting educated
becomes less attractive, and thus remaining an nish speaker may be a good option even if the size of the n group
shrinks.
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In this area, the size M of the dominant group is so large and consequently the productivity gain
and communication effect so strong relative to the cost of education, that each individual n prefers
to go to school independently of the choice of the other members of the group. In this case, the
bandwagon effect does not play.a role in educational choices.
Concerning the ms, they get educated if schooling is sufficiently cheap (for c < σ, in which
case (1, 1) is the unique equilibrium) and abstain from taking education otherwise (in which case
(1, 0) is the unique equilibrium).
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Fig. 2: Equilibrium education levels under the unilingual system
Moving to the south east crossing the M(c − σ) line, the bandwagon effect starts playing a
role. Indeed, as the n group gets larger and education becomes more expensive, remaining an
nish-speaker and avoiding to pay the cost of education becomes a good choice, but only of course
if other members of the dominated group choose the same strategy and do not attend school. For
this reason, we get that (in stable conÞgurations) either all the ns take education or none of them
does so. Concerning the ms, they choose to attend school when education is cheap and the ns are
in large numbers (in which case the stable equilibria are (0, 1) and (1, 1)) while they become more
and more reluctant to take education as its cost becomes higher (in this other extreme, the stable
equilibria are (0, 0) and (1, 0)).
Whenever education becomes sufficiently expensive (c > 1 + σ), the productivity gain and
communication effect are insufficient to cover the cost of education even in case the rest of the
population would decide to take education. The bandwagon effect vanishes and nobody takes
education independently of the choices of the other agents.
While the analysis gives rise to a series of different equilibrium conÞgurations, the existence of
a positive communication externality across groups is the basis for the following general result:
Proposition 1 Under the unilingual education system, equilibrium education levels are positively
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correlated across language groups in the following sense: in the cases with multiple equilibria high
(low) education levels among the ns are coupled with high (low) education levels among the ms.
Proof. Let zuni = (zunin , zunim ) and yuni = (yunin , yunim ) be two distinct equilibria of the game. We
need to establish that zunin > y
uni
n and z
uni
m < y
uni
m cannot simultaneously hold. Suppose they
do. yunim > z
uni
m ≥ 0 ⇒ 4Uunim (yuni) ≥ 0. ∂4Uunim /∂µn > 0 ⇒ 4Uunim (zuni) > 4Uunim (yuni) for
zunin > y
uni
n . Hence, z
uni
n > y
uni
n and y
uni
m > z
uni
m ⇒ 4Uunim (zuni) > 0 and thus zunim = 1, which
contradicts yunim > z
uni
m .
4.2 The bilingual education system
We now turn to equilibrium analysis under the bilingual system. Subtract (7) from (6) to get the
net beneÞt of taking education for an n:
4U bin = −c+M + σ. (10)
An n who takes education pays cost c, reaches M additional partners as she learns mish, and
gets an additional amount σ through production, as she is now skilled and she produces with
everybody. As we can see, the ns decision to take education is non-strategic under the bilingual
system.
The trade-off facing thems under the bilingual system is identical to the one facing them under
the unilingual system as we assume that the ms are never taught in nish:
4Um(µn) = −c+ (M +Nµn)σ. (11)
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Fig. 3: Equilibrium education levels under the bilingual system
The equilibrium levels of education are represented graphically in Figure 3. When education
is cheap (c < σ), the productivity effect alone is sufficient to render education proÞtable for the
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members of the dominated group. Anticipating the high educational levels of the other group,
the ms Þnd the communication externality sufficiently strong to render education proÞtable also
for them. Hence (1, 1) is the unique equilibrium in that case. When education is expensive,
(c > σ), the productivity gain is too weak relative to the cost of taking education to generate
sufficient incentives for the members of the dominant group to take education. The members
of the dominated group take education if and only if the communication effect is sufficiently
strong, i.e. if and only if the dominant group is sufficiently large relative to the cost of education
(M > c− σ).28
5 Welfare
This section considers the welfare properties of the two respective education systems. DeÞne
expected welfare under education system s ∈ {uni, bi} by
W s(µ) = N [µnU
s
n(µn) + (1− µn)Usn(µn)] +M [µmUsm(µn) + (1− µm)U sm(µn)].
As a Þrst step, we can compare the welfare levels under each system for given education levels:
Lemma 2 Expected welfare is higher under the bilingual system for given education levels.
Proof. Let µ = (µn, µm) be an exogenously Þxed education level. We just need to show that
utility is higher for each of the groups. Subtracting (1) from (6), the net beneÞt of a skilled n
of having a bilingual education system is U bin − Uuni(µn) = N(1 + σ)(1 − µn) ≥ 0. Subtracting
(3) from (7), the corresponding value for an unskilled n is U bin (µn)− Uunin (µn) = N(1 + σ)µn ≥ 0.
Finally, for the ms, U bim(µn)− Uuni(µn) = U bim(µn)− Uunim (µn) = 0.
The intuition for this lemma is simple: the bilingual system enables all the ns to maintain
communication and thus production relations with each other, irrespective of their level of educa-
tion. This is impossible under the unilingual system since the educated ns under this system lose
the ability to speak nish.
Of course, education levels are not exogenously given, hence we cannot on the background
of the above comparisons conclude that the bilingual is superior to the unilingual system from a
welfare point of view. We need to adjust for education levels.
28In a symmetric bilingual system, the ms get educated in some cases even for c− σ > 0, as they can learn nish
in school and there is thus also for them a communication effect associated to taking education. More precisely,
we get in that case that (0, 1) is the unique equilibrium when c−σ > M and M < 1− (c−σ) simultaneously hold.
Multiple equilibria {(1, 0), (ybin , ybim), (0, 1)} arise whenever M ∈ (c − σ, 1 − (c − σ)). In the rest of the parameter
space, the equilibria are as in Fig. 3. We attribute the existence of multiple equilibria in the symmetric bilingual
system to a duplication effect: the more people of the other group who learn ones language, the weaker is the own
incentive for learning the other language.
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5.1 Centralisation
Suppose there exists a benevolent social planner who is able to enforce the level of education that
maximises welfare under each system. Then, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 3 Under centralisation, the bilingual system yields higher expected welfare than the
unilingual system. The socially optimal education levels under the bilingual system are (1, 1) ∀
c < σ, (1, 0) ∀ (c,M) ∈ (σ, 2+σ)×((c−σ)/2, 1) and (0, 0) ∀ (c,M) ∈ (σ,∞)×(0,min{(c−σ)/2; 1}).
Proof. Write xs = (xsn, xsm) welfare maximising education levels under s ∈ {bi, uni}. From
Lemma 2, W bi(xuni) ≥ W uni(xuni). By optimality of xbi under the bilingual system, we have
W bi(xbi) ≥ W bi(xuni). Adding the two inequalities produces W bi(xbi) ≥ W uni(xuni).Socially
optimal education levels: by differentiating (6)-(5) with respect to µm and µn and plugging in
(6)-(5), it is easily veriÞed that (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
W biµm(µ) =M(σ − c−N(1− µn)σ)
W biµn(µ) = N(σ − c+M(2 + σµm))
.
W biµn(µ) > 0 for all c < σ implies xn = 1 for all c < σ. W
bi
µm
(1, µm) = M(σ − c) implies
xm = 1 for all c < σ, as well. W biµm(µ) < 0 for all c > σ implies xm = 0 for all c > σ.
W biµn(µn, 0) = N(σ − c+ 2M), hence xn = 1 for all (c,M) ∈ (σ, 2 + σ)× ((c− σ)/2, 1) and xn = 0
for all (c,M) ∈ (σ,∞)× (0,min{(c− σ)/2; 1}.
The central planner would always choose a bilingual system if able to fully control educational
levels of the population. It is not hard to understand why. For given education levels, more people
communicate, hence produce, under a bilingual than a unilingual system. As welfare is increasing
ceteris paribus in production, it immediately follows that the bilingual is better than the unilingual
system. Unsurprisingly, optimal education levels are decreasing in the cost of taking education.
Whenever education costs are relatively high and it is not optimal that all the individuals get
educated, the central planner chooses to educate the ns, as the education of the ms never has
an impact on communication. Everything else held equal, optimal education levels are higher the
larger M , as the positive impact on communication associated to the ns learning mish is in that
case larger.
5.2 Decentralised educational choice
In reality, of course, no central planner can perfectly control the amount of effort students put into
their studies, even in a system with mandatory education.29 To capture this degree of freedom,
consider therefore a situation in which the central planner chooses the education system taking
into account the free choices of individuals concerning school attendance. Let γbi and γuni be two
29There is for example a growing empirical literature on the effectiveness of Þnancial incentives for school atten-
dance in developing economies (see e.g. Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) and the references therein).
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equilibrium levels of education under each respective education system. While it is still the case
that W bi(γuni) ≥ W uni(γuni), it is unclear whether W bi(γbi) ≥ W uni(γuni). In other terms, the
central planner may prefer the unilingual system if it leads to a sufficiently higher decentralised
education level.
As previously shown, multiple equilibria sometimes arise under the unilingual system. In
models with multiple equilibria, predictions generally depend on the equilibria that are under
consideration. We thus focus on results that hold for comparisons of all equilibria. Some of
our results depend on the exclusion of an interior unstable equilibrium, but most do not. In the
subsequent analysis, we discuss the matter of equilibrium selection whenever relevant.
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Fig. 4: Optimal decentralised education system   
 
Figure 4 characterises the optimal decentralised education system (appendix 9.3 contains the
formal derivations).30 Remember that the bandwagon effect is at play only in the unilingual
system, since under bilingual education all the ns keep nish. The bandwagon effect works either
to the favour or to the disfavour of society, and does so in a non-linear fashion. In the polar
case when the dominant group is very large relative to the cost of taking education (region I) the
bandwagon effect is bad for society as it may lock the members of the dominated group in a low-
education equilibrium. In the other polar case, when the size of the dominant group is very small
relative to the cost of education (region IIb), the bandwagon effect is still negative as it may lock
agents in a costly high education equilibrium. In the intermediate case (Region IIa), the bilingual
system fails to produce sufficient incentives for taking education, while the bandwagon effect can
push education levels under the unilingual system to a level which would be impossible to reach
under a bilingual system. Thus, despite the fact that the unilingual system is technologically
30The Þgure is drawn assuming σ > 1. This is irrelevant to the results we have obtained.
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inferior to the bilingual system, the unilingual system is nevertheless optimal in this case since it
provides stronger incentives for taking education than the bilingual system.31
In the remaining cases, the bandwagon effect does not play any role at equilibrium in the
unilingual system, as either education is very cheap relative to the size of the dominant group, or
very expensive. As a result, the two systems lead to identical education and welfare levels.
6 The choice of education system
This section analyses how the ms and the ns rank the unilingual education system with respect
to the bilingual system, taking into account the equilibrium education levels arising under each
system. In particular, we study whether language conßict can endogenously arise in our set-up,
and whether this conßict is of the expected type, i.e. a situation in which the ns favour bilingualism
while the ms defend unilingualism. In addition, we determine which political rules (if any) enable
society to reach the decentralised optimum.
The preferences of the dominant group over education systems can be characterised as follows:
Lemma 4 The dominant group prefers the education system that maximises the dominated groups
equilibrium education level.
Proof. The two systems are identical from the point of view of the ms, save the equilibrium
education levels, hence we need only show that the ms prefer more to less education. Write um(γ)
indirect utility given an equilibrium γ:
um(γ) = M +Nγn + γm4Um(γn)
= M +Nγn + γm(−c+ (M +Nγn)σ),
and consider two equilibria γs and γt, with γsn ≥ γtn. Subtract um(γt) from um(γs) and simplify
to obtain
um(γ
s)− um(γt) = (γsm − γtm)4Um(γsn) + γtm(4Um(γsn)−4Um(γtn)) +N(γsn − γtn)
= (γsm − γtm)4Um(γsn) + (γsn − γtn)N(1 + γtmσ)
The Þrst term is non-negative. This is trivially true for γsm = γ
t
m. γ
s
m > γ
t
m ≥ 0 implies
4Um(γsn) ≥ 0 and γsm < γtm ≤ 1 implies 4Um(γsn) ≤ 0, hence (γsm − γtm)4Um(γsn) ≥ 0 even for
γsm 6= γtm. The second term is non-negative [positive] for γsn ≥ [>]γtn, hence γsn ≥ [>]γtn implies
um(γ
s) ≥ [>]um(γt). Generically γbin = 1 or γbin = 0. In the Þrst case s = bi and in the second
s = uni.
31In Region IIa, preference for the unilingual system depends on the exclusion of the unstable interior equilibrium
under the unilingual system. Intuitively, whenever the size of the dominated group is large and education costly it
is better that nobody takes education than only a fraction, since the production surplus then created is insufficient
to cover the cost of education.
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The intuition for the lemma goes as follows. Note Þrst that the ms attend the same type of
school under both educations systems, in the sense that they never learn nish under any of the
two possible institutional arrangements. This means that the only way the ms can expand their
set of production partners is by inducing the members of the other group to take education and
thus learn mish. Hence, the best education system is the one that expands to a larger extent the
set of production partners.
Consider next the preferences of the dominated group:
Lemma 5 The dominated group either prefers the bilingual system or is indifferent between the
two systems.
Proof. Consider two arbitrary equilibria, γbi and γuni under the bilingual and unilingual systems,
respectively. We demonstrate below that ubin ≥ uunin (γuni) for all possible equilibria γuni. Hence,
ubin ≥ uunin and the bilingual system is preferred. Subtract uunin (γuni) from ubin :
ubin − uunin (γuni) = (γbin − γunin )4U bin + γunin (4U bin −4Uunin (γuni)) + U bin − Uunin (γuni)
= Nγunin (1− γunin )(2 + σ) + (γbin − γunin )4U bin .
The Þrst term is obviously non-negative. So is the second. This is trivially true for γbin = γ
uni
n .
γbin > γ
uni
n ≥ 0 implies 4U bin ≥ 0 and γbin < γunin ≤ 1 implies 4U bin ≤ 0, hence (γbin − γunin )4U bin ≥ 0
even for γbin 6= γunin . Thus ubin ≥ uunin (γuni) for all possible equilibria γbi and γuni.
The members of the dominated group prefer the bilingual over the unilingual system due to the
absence of negative network externalities (the absence of a bandwagon effect) under the bilingual
system. In other terms, under the unilingual system the ns are compelled in some cases to take
education even if it is relatively expensive since this is the only way of learning mish and avoiding
to remain insulated from the rest of society.32
The joint implication of the two lemmas above is that political tension will arise between the
two language groups precisely in the circumstances under which the unilingual system provides
stronger incentives than the bilingual system for the dominated group to become educated. In
this case, the members of the dominant group go for the unilingual system, hoping to lock in
the members of the other group in a high-education equilibrium, whereas the members of the
dominated group go for a bilingual system precisely in order to avoid the same situation from
happening. This situation corresponds to Region II in Figure 5 below, which displays how the
preferences of the two groups vary with group size and the relative cost of education. When the
32The unilingual system sometimes provides stronger incentives for taking education than the bilingual system.
Hence, one might expect circumstances to arise under which the ns nevertheless opt for the unilingual system. This
is not the case here, as the unilingual system provides stronger incentives for taking education than bilingualism
precisely in those circumstances under which the ns would be better-off if no one took any education at all (i.e. those
situations where the dominated group is large and education expensive). In section 7, we show that a preference
of the ns for unilingual education is an equilibrium outcome when there are spillovers in production.
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cost of taking education is high relative to the size of the dominant group (c > M + σ), but still
not too high (c < 1+σ), the communication effect is insufficient to render education proÞtable for
any group under the bilingual system, but the bandwagon effect is sufficiently strong to generate
positive education levels in the unilingual system. Figure 5 shows that this is the only type of
language conßict that we get. This is an interesting result since language conßict is here of the
observed type and does not rely on any direct utility enjoyed by the agents from speaking their
own native language. In contrast, language conßict is an equilibrium phenomenon. The members
of the dominated group want their language to be a language of instruction in school not because
they like it but rather because abandoning it would force them to overinvest in education. In
the same way, the ms may prefer unilingualism not because they dislike nish or because they
likemish but because a unilingual school guarantees that more people will learnmish and that the
value of production is higher for the ms without additional costs. In other terms, the ms free-ride
on the costs of speaking a common language, which are entirely paid for by the ns.33
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Fig. 5: Choice of education system
Under a wide range of circumstances, there is no political tension over the choice of education
system. When education is relatively cheap (c < M + σ) both groups either prefer the bilingual
system or are indifferent between the two. Education is so cheap that it is important for both
groups to generate the strongest possible incentive for taking education, i.e. to eliminate possible
negative bandwagon effects. For this reason, a bilingual system is chosen in region I.
When education is expensive (c > 1 + σ), the communication effect is too weak relative to
the cost of education to generate sufficient incentives for taking education under either system.
33Adding an exogenous utility term of speaking ones mothertongue would only reinforce this result. The members
of the dominated group would have an additional reason for selecting a bilingual system. The members of the
dominating group would not modify their decision, as they maintain their mothertongue under both systems.
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Hence, the choice of system is immaterial.34
Having identiÞed the preferences of the two groups (Figure 5), we are now able to determine
the ability of different political rules to reach the decentralised optimum (Figure 4). Alternative
political rules can differ at equilibrium in our model only in terms of the solution to the language
conßict in region II.
Consider Þrst a democratic system, here represented by majority rule. Under majority rule,
political decisions are taken so as to suit the needs of the majority. In the context of our model, we
have exogenously assigned political dominance to the m group. Democratic rule thus corresponds
to a situation in which the dominant group (the ms) constitutes a majority, i.e. M > 0.5.35 By a
comparison of Figure 5 and Figure 4, we Þnd a perfect match between the two Þgures forM > 0.5:
Proposition 6 Majority rule leads to the adoption of the socially optimal education system.
Thus under a democracy the language conßict arising in region II forM > 0.5 is solved through
the adoption of a unilingual system, which is socially optimal for these parameter values. In that
particular area, a unilingual system is to be preferred from a social viewpoint because it provides
(through the bandwagon effect) stronger incentives for the ns to be educated and this is good since
education is not very expensive and the ns constitute a relatively small fraction of the population.
Consider next the outcome under minority rule, for example in autocracy, in which case the
minority is the dominant group (M < 0.5). In that case comparison of Figure 5 and Figure 4 for
M < 0.5 yields:
Proposition 7 The unilingual system is implemented too often under minority rule.
Under minority rule, the ms impose a unilingual system in some cases in which society as a
whole would have been better-off under a bilingual system. More speciÞcally, according to our
model, this problem is likely to arise in situations in which the cost of education is quite high
and the dominant group is small. In such a context, education of the ns is not desirable from
a social viewpoint since education is expensive, but the bandwagon effect under the unilingual
system forces the ns to take education and this beneÞts the ms.
We can now come back to the empirical puzzle presented in section 2. Taking into account
that a unilingual system will be chosen in the language conßict area II in Figure 5, it is clear from
34If we compare the unilingual system with a symmetric bilingual system, we obtain an additional region of
language conßict of the expected type when c − σ > 0, M < 1 − (c − σ), and M > M(c − σ) are simultaneously
satisÞed. In addition, for c−σ > 0, M < 1− (c−σ), and M <M(c−σ) simultaneously veriÞed, the choices of the
ms are indeterminate, as they prefer the unilingual or the bilingual system depending on the equilibrium selection.
In the rest of the parameter space, the results are as in Fig. 5.
35To understand why M < 0.5 does not correspond to a democratic regime with a majority of ns, it is sufficient
to note that in that case the ns would prefer a unilingual nish system to a unilingual mish system and the majority
always prefers a system in which the minority becomes bilingual to one in which the majority becomes bilingual.
In other terms, as the ms have been arbitrarily assigned to the role of dominant group, a democratic regime with
a majority of ns is identical to a democratic regime with a majority of ms.
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inspection of that Figure that, in the absence of information concerning the net cost of education
c − σ, the size M of the dominant group does not determine whether a unilingual or a bilingual
education system arises in equilibrium.
Finally, Figure 6 compares the equilibrium education levels under the selected decentralised
system (from Figures 2, 3, and 5) with the Þrst best education levels (from Proposition 3). The Þrst
thing to be noted is that the decentralised systems lead to a full education equilibrium whenever
c < σ, and this corresponds precisely to the case in which the (1, 1) equilibrium is socially optimal.
In other terms, the introduction of a compulsory education system is not necessary in our model
in order to get full education when this is efficient. A second result is that equilibrium education
levels can actually be suboptimally too high, as in area IIb in Figure 6. In this area, the dominant
group imposes a unilingual system with education levels {(0, 0), (yn, 0), (1, 0)}, while the bilingual
system favoured by the dominated group would have lead to the optimal education level (0, 0). In
the remaining cases, the political process leads either to the optimum amount of education or to
undereducation due to the presence of positive communication externalities from education.
 
                                                            M                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                     
                                                       
                                                                                       
                                                                                OPTIMALITY  
                                                                                       )0,1(                  UNDEREDUCATION 
                             OPTIMALITY                                                                                                        
                                   )1,1(                                                                                               OPTIMALITY 
                                                                                                                                                                                )0,0(  
                                                                                                  
                                                                                                     
        OVEREDUCATION 
                                                                                                              (IIb) 
 
          σ−                                                 0                                                                   1                                                                2    σ−c  
Fig. 6: Optimality of the equilibrium education levels under the selected decentralised system 
 
7 Productivity Spillovers
We consider now productivity spillovers, i.e. a situation in which the productivity of each agent
positively depends on the skill level of the other production partner. SpeciÞcally, assume that,
with respect to the benchmark, total bilateral production increases by σ each time a skilled agent
participates to the match. Thus, a match between two unskilled produces still 2, an unskilled-
skilled match produces 1 + (1 + σ) + σ = 2+ 2σ instead of 1 + (1 + σ), and a match between two
skilled (1 + σ) + (1 + σ) + 2σ = 2 + 4σ instead of (1 + σ) + (1 + σ). Assume also for simplicity
that output is equally shared among production partners.
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Consider Þrst the unilingual system. With spillovers, the new pay-offs for a skilled, an unskilled
m and an unskilled n are respectively given by:eUuni(µ) = −c+M [(1 + 2σ)µm + (1 + σ)(1− µm)] +N(1 + 2σ)µn, (12)
eUunim (µ) =M [(1 + σ)µm + (1− µm)] +N(1 + σ)µn, (13)
eUunin (µ) = N(1− µn) = Uunin (µ). (14)
Note Þrst that the pays-offs of the skilled and the unskilled ms (repectively (12) and (13)) are
now increasing in µm, as the decision of an additional m to take education exerts a positive skill
externality on all the agents who are able to speak mish. However, as in the benchmark model,
the ms never choose to take education for c > σ (see Ortega and Tangerås, 2003, for analytical
details), thus implying that the interaction between the education decisions of thems does not play
a role in equilibrium. The crucial difference with the benchmark is the existence of a new channel
through which the net gain from education for an n increases with the number of educated ns.
Indeed, while the value of not taking education for an n remains as in the benchmark (as shown in
(14)), spillovers imply that skilled ns are more productive when they can meet many other skilled
ns. Mathematically, from (1) and (12) eUuni(µn, 0)− Uuni(µn, 0) = σµnN , so with spillovers there
is an additional net gain from education equal to σ for each additional n that goes to school. In
other terms, the bandwagon effect in the education decisions among the ns becomes stronger with
spillovers.
Consider next bilingual education, with pay-offs:eU bin (µ) = −c+M [(1 + 2σ)µm + (1 + σ)(1− µm)] +N [(1 + 2σ)µn + (1 + σ)(1− µn)], (15)
eU bin (µ) = N [(1 + σ)µn + (1− µn)], (16)
eU bim(µ) =M [(1 + σ)µm + (1− µm)] +N(1 + σ)µn = eUunim (µ). (17)
Subtracting (17) from (15), the net pay-off from education for thems remains as in the benchmark.
The intuition is simple, as in both cases getting educated increases by σ the pay-off obtained in
each match with an mish speaker.36 Concerning the ns, subtracting (16) from (15),
4eU bin = −c+M [(1 + σ)µm + (1− µm)] + σ. (18)
so the pay-off from education for the ns is in principle different from that of the benchmark, given
by (10). However, as in the benchmark, the ms do not take education in equilibrium for c > σ,
thus implying that µm = 0 and that (18) becomes equal to (10). For these reasons, the equilibrium
education levels under bilingualism remain as in the benchmark.
36In the benchmark, becoming skilled increases from 1 to 1 + σ the pay-off in a match with an unskilled m, a
skilled m or an n (necessarily skilled, as she would otherwise not speak mish). With spillovers, the pay-off increases
from 1 to 1 + σ with an unskilled m and from 1 + σ to 1 + 2σ with a skilled m or with a skilled n.
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Fig.7: choice of education system, case with spillovers
Figure 7 displays the preferences of the two groups over education systems for c > σ in the
case with spillovers. The main difference with respect to the preferences in the benchmark (see
Figure 5) is that there is now sometimes unanimity for the unilingual system i.e. the members
of the dominated group are perfectly willing to give up education in their own language and
the members of the dominant group perfectly happy to accomodate their wishes.37 This is an
interesting result as we have given a technological advantage to the bilingual over the unilingual
system.38 Unanimity for the unilingual system arises forM < c−σ butM sufficiently close to c−σ
(region III). In the benchmark, this was formerly a language conßict region (see Figure 5), as the
ns preferred the bilingual system in order to avoid being trapped in a high education equilibrium
through the bandwagon effect.39 In contrast, spillovers render beneÞcial the bandwagon effect in
region III and shift the preferences of the ns towards a unilingual system. In other terms, in area
III the (1, 0) equilibrium under unilingualism becomes more proÞtable for the ns than the (0, 0)
equilibrium under either system because taking education brings about productivity gains that
were absent in the benchmark.
37This result depends on the exclusion of the unstable interior unilingual equilibrium. Otherwise preferences
would be indeterminate.
38Adding an exogenous utility of speaking ones own language would qualitatively affect the result if this utility
was large relative to the spillover effect. In that case, the members of the dominated group would still prefer the
bilingual system.
39In that case, the communication effect is not strong enough to make the (1, 0) equilibrium more attractive than
the (0, 0) equilibrium.
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8 Conclusion
While many countries are multilingual or have been historically constituted by several language
groups, language diversity has not always lead to language conßict between the groups when
coming to decide the language of instruction in school, nor has it been always the case that both
groups have agreed upon a unilingual or a bilingual system. A possible way of understanding this
variety of situations is to assume that agents get some utility from speaking their own language
and that compromise over language issues may be reached through political bargaining. However,
in that case, we would expect a larger language group to be ceteris paribus more likely to obtain
an education system in which its language is used as a language of instruction, and this is not
what we observe for France in 1863.
Here, we take a different stand on the issue and construct a model around the individual
incentives to attend school. We show that these incentives vary across groups depending on the
nature of the education system. In particular, under a unilingual system, the language group
that does not have its language used in school (the politically dominated group) has in general
stronger incentives to attend school. For this reason, this group will either bear a large part of
the costs necessary to the adoption of a common language, or actively defend a bilingual system
in order to avoid paying a large share of these costs. In contrast, the other group will defend
more frequently the exclusive use of its language in education in order to free-ride the educational
investment of the dominated group. Thus language conßict of the expected type is shown to
endogenously arise as the result of an economic conßict.
Should we expect language conßicts to end up in the adoption of the socially optimal language
system? According to our model, the answer crucially depends on the nature of political institu-
tions. SpeciÞcally, we show that democratic institutions (interpreted as majority rule) choose the
right education system, while minority rule chooses unilingual education too frequently.
Finally, when allowing for productivity spillovers among production partners, unanimity for a
unilingual education system becomes an additional equilibrium outcome, even if we have attributed
an advantage to bilingualism over unilingualism.
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9 Appendix
Let Γs be the (Þnite) set of equilibria under education system s ∈ {bi, uni} and γs ∈ Γs a speciÞc
equilibrium under system s. Let usm(γ
s) be the indirect utility a member of the m group attains
under system s given the play of γs and let usm be the indirect utility when there is a unique
equilibrium. As demonstrated below, the bilingual system generically has a unique equilibrium.
Write uunim = min{uunim (γuni)|γuni ∈ Γuni} (uunim = max{uunim (γuni)|γuni ∈ Γuni}), the minimum
(respectively, maximum) indirect utility that is attainable under the unilingual system. We shall
say that a member of the m group prefers the bilingual system (bi ºm uni ) if ubim ≥ uunim , that
she prefers the unilingual system (uni ºm bi ) if uunim ≥ ubim, and that she is indifferent between
the two (bi ∼m uni) if the equilibrium is unique also under the unilingual system and ubim = uunim .
These deÞnitions are extended to the n group and to expected welfare in the obvious way.
9.1 Equilibrium education levels under the unilingual system
This section derives generic equilibrium education levels under the unilingual system. We begin
by deriving the equilibrium education levels of the ns. Remember that
4Uunin (µn) = −c+ (M +Nµn)σ +M +Nµn −N(1− µn).
Note Þrst that ∂4Uunin /∂µn = N(1+ 2σ) > 0. Monotonicity of Uunin (·) in µn and 4Uunin (1) = 1+
σ−c imply that γunin = 0 is the unique equilibrium for c > 1+σ. Next,4Uunin (0) =M(1+σ)−N−c
and monotonicity of Uunin (·) in µn imply that γunin = 1 is the unique equilibrium for M >M with
M =
1 + c
2 + σ
.
Finally, with c− σ < 1 and M <M , the bandwagon effect generates multiple equilibria. γunin = 0
is an equilibrium since 4Uunin (0) < 0 , γunin = 1 is an equilibrium since 4Uunin (1) > 0, and
γunin = (M −M)/N is an equilibrium since 4Uunin ((M −M)/N) = 0.
Turn next to the education levels of the ms. Recall that
4Uunim (µn) = −c+ (M +Nµn)σ.
Note Þrst that ∂4Uunim /∂µn = Nσ > 0. Monotonicity of Uunim (·) in µn and4Uunim (1) = σ−c imply
that γunim = 0 is the unique equilibrium for c > σ. Next, 4Uunim (0) =Mσ− c and monotonicity of
Uunim (·) in µn imply γunim = 1 for all M >M with
M =
c
σ
.
For c < σ and M < M , the equilibrium education level γunim depends on γ
uni
n . First, γ
uni
n = 1
implies γunim = 1 since 4Uunim (1) = σ − c > 0. Second, γunin = 0 implies γunim = 0 since 4Uunim (0) =
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(M −M)σ < 0. Finally,
4Uunim (
M −M
N
) =Mσ − c = σ − 2c
2 + σ
.
Hence, γunin = (M −M)/N implies γunin = 1 for 2c < σ and γunin = 0 for 2c > σ. The equilibrium
conÞgurations are depicted in Figure 2.
9.2 Equilibrium education levels under the bilingual system
As opposed to the unilingual case, the bilingual case generates a unique equilibrium for almost
every parameter conÞguration. Let γbi = (γbin , γ
bi
m) denote this equilibrium. An inspection of eq.
(10) reveals 4U bin (µ) > 0 for all c < σ hence γbin = 1 for all c < σ. 4U bim(1, µm) = σ − c > 0
within the same paramterer range, hence γbi = (1, 1) for all c < σ. Consider next c > σ.
In this case 4U bim(µ) < 0 follows from inspection of eq. (11), hence γbim = 0 for all c > σ.
4U bin (µn, 0) = M + σ − c. Thus γbi = (1, 0) for all c ∈ (σ, 1 + σ) and M ∈ (c − σ, 1), whereas
γbi = (0, 0) for all c > σ and M ∈ (0,min{c− σ; 1}). The equilibrium conÞgurations are depicted
in Figure 3.
9.3 Welfare
This appendix derives the socially optimal welfare system under decentralised education choice.
Expected welfare W s(γs) in equilibrium γs = (γsn, γ
s
m) under system s ∈ {bi, uni} is deÞned by
W s(γs) = Nusn(γ
s) +Musm(γ
s),
with
W bi(γbi)−W uni(γuni) = N(ubin (γbi)− uunin (γuni)) +M(ubim(γbi)− uunim (γuni))
where
usk(γ
s) = γskU
s
k(γ
s) + (1− γsk)Usk(γs), k ∈ {n,m}.
By plugging in the relevant expressions, we obtain
ubin (γ
bi)− uunin (γuni) = (γbin − γunin )(M + σ − c) +Nγunin (1− γunin )(2 + σ)
ubim(γ
bi)− uunim (γuni) = N(γbin − γunin ) + (γbim − γunim )(Mσ − c) +N(γbinγbim − γunin γunim )σ.
Consider Þrst the case with c < σ and M ∈ (0,M). In this case the unilingual system gives rise
to multiple equilibria, and the bilingual equilibrium implements the full education equilibrium.
W bi(1, 1)−W uni(γuni) = N(1− γunin )(M(2 + σγunim ) +Nγunin (2 + σ))
+(N(1− γunin ) +M(1− γunim ))(σ − c)
≥ 0
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implies a welfare preference for the bilingual system.
For c ∈ (0,σ) and M ∈ (M, 1), both systems implement the full education equilibrium. Since
W bi(1, 1) =W uni(1, 1), the choice of education system does not affect welfare in this case.
For c ∈ (σ, 1 + σ) and M ∈ (0, (c − σ)/2), Γuni = {(0, 0), ((M −M)/N, 0), (1, 0)} and Γbi =
{(0, 0)}. By plugging in the correct expressions and simplifying, we obtain:
W bi(0, 0)−W uni(γunin , 0) = Nγunin (N(1− γunin )(2 + σ) + c− σ − 2M) ≥ 0.
In this case the bilingual system is optimal from a welfare point of view.
For c ∈ (σ, 1 + σ) and M ∈ ((c − σ)/2, c − σ), education levels are still the same as above.
Now, W uni(1, 0) > W bi(0, 0) = W uni(0, 0). If we restrict attention to the set of stable equilibria,
the unilingual system becomes optimal. However, W uni((M −M)/N, 0) > W uni(0, 0) if and only
if M > 0.5, hence preferences are indeterminate if M < 0.5 and all equilibria are included in the
comparison.
For c ∈ (σ, 1 + σ) and M ∈ (c − σ,M), the unilingual equilibria are the same as above, but
now Γbi = {(1, 0)}. By straightforward computations, we obtain
W bi(1, 0)−W uni(γunin , 0) = N(1− γunin )(2M − (c− σ) +Nγunin (2 + σ)) ≥ 0,
hence the bilingual system is optimal.
For c ∈ (σ, 1 + σ) and M ∈ (M, 1) and for c > 1 + σ both systems give rise to identical
equilibria, (1,0) in the Þrst case and (0,0) in the second. The choice of education system has no
effect on welfare in this Þnal case because W bi(1, 0) =W uni(1, 0) and W bi(0, 0) =W uni(0, 0).
The optimal decentralised education system is depicted in Figure 4.
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